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The Due Process Clause and Students: The Road 
to a Single Approach of Determining Property 
Interests in Education 
Dalton Mott 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a university professor accuses a student of cheating on a 
final exam.  Before the student can defend herself, the university decides 
to expel the student.  Understandably, the student decides she wants to 
challenge the expulsion as a violation of her due process rights.  Can the 
student challenge the action?  Surprisingly, the answer depends on the 
federal circuit in which the student lives.  In 1975, the United States 
Supreme Court held that state law could provide primary students a 
property interest in their education.1  However, forty years later, courts 
remain uncertain of when such an interest exists for university students. 
In Goss v. Lopez, the Supreme Court extended due process 
protections to a group of high school students in Ohio.2  The Supreme 
Court determined that Ohio state law provided the high school students a 
property interest in their continued enrollment at the school and that the 
Due Process Clause protected such an interest.3  The Supreme Court did 
not address whether university students have a similar property interest.  
Since Goss, many university students have brought due process claims 
against their schools, but lower courts have struggled to determine when 
a university student’s interest in education rises to the level of a property 
interest under the Due Process Clause.4 
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 1.   Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975). 
 2.   Id. at 577–79. 
 3.   Id. at 573–74. 
 4.   See Barbara A. Lee, Judicial Review of Student Challenges to Academic Misconduct 
Sanctions, 39 J.C. & U.L. 511, 524–25 (2013) (recognizing that circuits have reached different 
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Lower courts adopt one of three approaches to determine whether a 
student has a property interest in education protected by the Due Process 
Clause.  Under the first approach—the state-specific approach—courts 
analyze state law to determine whether it provides students a property 
interest.5  Under the second approach—the generalized approach—courts 
rely on Goss as a basis to provide all students a property interest in 
education regardless of state law.6  Under the final approach—the 
assumption approach—courts assume a property interest exists in 
education but do not decide the question.7 
The lack of Supreme Court precedent on this issue has led to 
confusion and uncertainty for both lower courts and parties.8  Although 
students bring many due process claims each year, the question of 
whether a property interest exists remains unpredictable and varies by 
jurisdiction.9  For example, a student in the Tenth Circuit has a property 
interest in her education regardless of state law.10  In contrast, a student 
in the Fourth Circuit must prove state law provides her with a property 
interest,11 and a student in the Fifth Circuit is assumed to have a property 
interest in her education.12  Because of this uncertainty, courts may 
entertain meritless claims, which hurts both judicial efficiency and 
parties.13 
To address these concerns, federal courts should no longer avoid the 
property interest question; instead, courts should adopt the state-specific 
approach to determine whether a student has a property interest in her 
education.  The Supreme Court has largely settled the property interest 
question for primary school students by finding that compulsory 
education laws create a property interest for all elementary and high 
school students.14  In contrast, the Supreme Court has not settled this 
question for higher education and thus this Comment focuses on 
undergraduate and graduate students.  This Comment does not take a 
                                                          
results on whether students have a property interest in education). 
 5.   See, e.g., Charleston v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill. at Chi., 741 F.3d 769, 772–74 (7th 
Cir. 2013). 
 6.   See, e.g., Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 1988). 
 7.   See, e.g., Richmond v. Fowlkes, 228 F.3d 854, 857 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 8.   See Fernand N. Dutile, Students and Due Process in Higher Education: Of Interests and 
Procedures, 2 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 243, 288–89 (2001). 
 9.   See infra Sections II.B–C. 
 10.   See infra Section II.B.2. 
 11.   See infra Section II.B.1. 
 12.   See infra Section II.C.2. 
 13.   See infra Section III.A.2. 
 14.   See infra Section III.B.2.b. 
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position on whether students should or should not have a property 
interest in their education; instead, it focuses on why courts should adopt 
a single approach to education-based property interests. 
This Comment’s analysis is divided into two parts.  The first part 
addresses why courts should no longer assume a student has a property 
interest in education.15  It will address why the assumption approach is 
not supported by Supreme Court precedent and will argue that it is time 
for courts to begin to decide the property interest question.  The second 
part addresses why courts should use the state-specific approach instead 
of the generalized approach.16  This section will address why the 
generalized approach has undermined precedent on property interests and 
as a result has created a circuit split on whether the Constitution provides 
students a generalized property interest in their education.  Finally, this 
section will address the advantages of the state-specific approach and 
explain how the approach is practical for courts to use. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Since Goss, education-based due process litigation has exploded in 
federal courts.17  One of the major issues in these cases is whether higher 
education students have a property interest in their education.18  The 
Supreme Court has heard two education due process claims since Goss, 
but in both cases the Supreme Court chose to assume, without deciding, 
that a property interest in education existed.19  Therefore, the Supreme 
Court did not reach the merits of the property interest issue.  In the wake 
of the Supreme Court’s reluctance to decide the issue, lower courts have 
struggled to determine whether students have a property interest in 
education, and unsurprisingly, circuits are split on the issue.20 
This section proceeds in three parts.  The first part discusses the 
background for Goss v. Lopez and property interests in general.  The 
second part examines Goss and the two approaches that have arisen from 
the decision: the state-specific approach and the generalized approach.  
                                                          
 15.   See infra Section III.A. 
 16.   See infra Section III.B. 
 17.   See Deborah L. Ford & John L. Strope, Jr., Judicial Responses to Adverse Academic 
Decisions Affecting Public Postsecondary Institution Students Since “Horowitz” and “Ewing”, 110 
EDUC. L. REP. 517, 517 (1996) (analyizing fifty-nine education-based due process cases). 
 18.   See infra Sections II.B–C. 
 19.   See Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 82–85 (1978); Regents 
of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 222–23 (1985). 
 20.   See Dutile, supra note 8, at 254–58, 261–62. 
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Finally, the third part examines the two later Supreme Court decisions, 
Board of Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz and Regents 
of the University of Michigan v. Ewing, and the development of the 
assumption approach to property interests.21 
A. Due Process and Property Interests 
During the 1970s, the Supreme Court began a period known as the 
due process revolution, and Goss was a product of that revolution.22  
Before the 1970s, the Supreme Court “routinely denied due process 
protection . . . [to] government service[s] [and] benefit[s].”23  Courts 
viewed these benefits as privileges and not rights.24  During the due 
process revolution, the Supreme Court recognized many new property 
interests in government benefits.25  Many scholars have argued this 
change represented a radical shift in how the Supreme Court had always 
viewed property interests.26  Other scholars have criticized this position, 
though, instead arguing the Supreme Court was simply recognizing a 
long-term practice of protecting government benefits.27  While this 
Comment does not take a position on this debate, the debate does provide 
context for the Goss decision. 
With this history in mind, there are two main questions that the 
Supreme Court uses to define property interests.  The first question is 
what the source of property interests is.  Property interests are a “positive 
law” concept, meaning they derive from another source of law.28  In 
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, the Supreme Court held that 
“[p]roperty interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution.  
Rather they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules 
or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state 
law.”29  Courts broadly define state law, and therefore, property interests 
can arise from a variety of sources such as statutes, regulations, 
                                                          
 21.   See Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 82–85; Ewing, 474 U.S. at 222–23. 
 22.   Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Due Process Counterrevolution of the 1990s?, 96 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1973, 1973, 1983 (1996). 
 23.   1 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE 71 (2d ed. 1997). 
 24.   Id. 
 25.   See Pierce, supra note 22, at 1973–80. 
 26.   See, e.g., id. at 1980. 
 27.   See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Government Benefits and the Rule of 
Law: Toward a Standards-Based Theory of Due Process, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 107, 119–26 (2005). 
 28.   Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 920–
21 (2000) (explaining the positive-law nature of property interests). 
 29.   408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). 
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contracts, or even implied contracts.30  Furthermore, implied contracts 
can come from many different sources such as handbooks or academic 
regulations.31  Aside from state law, other sources such as municipal law 
can also serve as a source for property interests.32 
The second question is what qualifies as a property interest.  Courts 
use a two-tiered system for determining what qualifies as a property 
interest.  First, as previously mentioned, courts determine whether state 
law provides a valid entitlement, and second, courts determine whether 
the nature of the interest, rather than the weight or importance of the 
interest, deserves constitutional protection.33  The hallmark of a property 
interest is that the party “[has] a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.”34  
Merely having an adverse effect on a plaintiff when removed is not 
sufficient to create a property interest.35  Normally, a benefit does not 
qualify as a property interest if the state has discretion over the 
entitlement.36  Courts determine whether a state has discretion by looking 
to whether standards govern whether a benefit can be removed.37  
Property interests go beyond traditional types of property, such as land or 
goods.38  They can include a wide range of government benefits.39  For 
example, the Supreme Court has recognized property interests in welfare 
benefits,40 government employment,41 social security benefits,42 and 
licenses.43  In summation, plaintiffs have protected property interests if 
they can show state law provides them a valid entitlement. 
                                                          
 30.   See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344–45 (1976). 
 31.   See Ikpeazu v. Univ. of Neb., 775 F.2d 250, 253 (8th Cir. 1985) (citing Corso v. Creighton 
Univ., 731 F.2d 529, 531–33 (8th Cir. 1984)). 
 32.   Bishop, 426 U.S. at 344–45. 
 33.   See RHONDA WASSERMAN, PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 31 (2004). 
 34.   Roth, 408 U.S. at 577; see also Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 441–43 (1979). 
 35.   See 2 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 579 (4th ed. 2002). 
 36.   See Michael L. Wells & Alice E. Snedeker, State-Created Property and Due Process of 
Law: Filling the Void Left by Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture, 44 GA. L. REV. 161, 
174 (2009) (describing the reasoning and conclusions of the Court in Town of Castle Rock v. 
Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005)). 
 37.   See KOCH, supra note 23, at 78. 
 38.   Wells & Snedeker, supra note 36, at 172. 
 39.   Id. 
 40.   Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262–63 (1970). 
 41.   Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 539 (1985). 
 42.   Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). 
 43.   Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971). 
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B. Goss v. Lopez 
Goss serves as the main framework for education-based due process 
claims.  In Goss, a high school suspended a group of students for ten 
days for disciplinary reasons.44  The students brought a due process claim 
against the school, alleging that they were not provided sufficient 
process.45  The district court—made up of a three-judge panel—
determined that the students had a protected interest in their education 
and that the school had denied them required process.46  The defendants 
appealed the decision, and pursuant to statute, the Supreme Court 
directly heard the case.47  The first issue the Supreme Court decided was 
whether the students had a property interest in their continued enrollment 
at the school.48  The Supreme Court first noted that Board of Regents v. 
Roth requires property interests to derive from an independent source of 
law.49  Then, the Supreme Court held that “on the basis of state law, [the 
students] plainly had legitimate claims of entitlement to a public 
education.”50  The Supreme Court found that the property interests 
derived from two Ohio state laws: the first provided free education to all 
residents between the ages of five and twenty-one and the second made 
education compulsory for students.51  After determining there was a 
property interest, the Supreme Court next determined that the property 
deprivation was “not de minimis,” or not trivial, and thus should receive 
protection under the Due Process Clause.52  The Supreme Court went on 
to decide that the school did not provide the students sufficient process 
and that the school should have provided the students a hearing and 
notice of what they were accused of.53 
Since Goss, many students have brought due process claims against 
educational institutions.54  Over time, courts have extended Goss in a 
variety of ways.  For example, some courts have extended Goss from 
                                                          
 44.   Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 568 (1975). 
 45.   Id. at 568–69. 
 46.   Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 1279, 1300, 1302 (S.D. Ohio 1973), aff’d sub nom. Goss 
v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
 47.   Goss, 419 U.S. at 572 (noting jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2012)). 
 48.   Id. at 572–74. 
 49.   Id. at 572–73 (citing Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). 
 50.   Id. at 573. 
 51.   Id. at 573–74 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.48, 3313.64, 3321.04 (West 1972 & 
Supp. 1973)). 
 52.   Id. at 576. 
 53.   Id. at 580–84. 
 54.   Ford & Strope, supra note 17 (discussing fifty-nine education-based due process cases). 
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primary students to undergraduate students.55  Some courts have also 
extended due process protections to graduate and professional students.56  
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether a college or graduate 
student has a property interest in her education.57 
The question of whether a student has a property interest in her 
education has become a major source of dispute in lower courts.58  Goss 
has caused a circuit split on how to determine whether a student has a 
property interest in higher education.59  Courts have used three main 
approaches when making this determination.  The first approach is to 
look at each specific state’s education laws to determine whether they 
provide a property interest.60  The second approach is to not consider 
state law and instead find a generalized property interest in education.61  
The third approach—where courts assume a property interest in 
education exists—is discussed in Section II.C of this Comment.  While 
courts may have a primary method to determine property interests in 
education, courts may use different approaches, even within the same 
circuit.62 
                                                          
 55.   Dina Lallo, Note, Student Challenges to Grades and Academic Dismissals: Are They 
Losing Battles?, 18 J.C. & U.L. 577, 579 (1992). 
 56.   See, e.g., Borrell v. Bloomsburg Univ., 955 F. Supp. 2d 390, 402–03 (M.D. Pa. 2013). 
 57.   See Hennessy v. City of Melrose, 194 F.3d 237, 249 (1st Cir. 1999); Doe v. Alger, 175 F. 
Supp. 3d 646, 656 (W.D. Va. 2016). 
 58.   See, e.g., Hennessy, 194 F.3d at 249–50; Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 705 (2d Cir. 
1991); Davis v. George Mason Univ., 395 F. Supp. 2d 331, 335–36 (E.D. Va. 2005), aff’d, 193 F. 
App’x 248 (4th Cir. 2006); Charleston v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill. at Chi., 741 F.3d 769, 772–
74 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 59.   See Jenkins v. Hutton, 967 F. Supp. 277, 282 (S.D. Ohio 1997). 
 60.   See infra Section II.B.1. 
 61.   See infra Section II.B.2. 
 62.   Compare Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843, 850 (10th Cir. 1975) (using the generalized 
approach), with Trotter v. Regents of the Univ. of N.M., 219 F.3d 1179, 1184 (10th Cir. 2000) (using 
the state-specific approach). 
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1. The State-Specific Approach to Education Property Interests 
The state-specific approach requires both plaintiffs and courts to 
carefully examine state law to determine whether a student has a 
property interest in her education.  Currently the Second,63 Third,64 
Fourth,65 Seventh,66 Ninth,67 and Eleventh68 Circuits utilize a state-
specific approach.  Courts that use a state-specific approach reject the 
notion that Goss recognizes a generalized property interest in 
education.69  Instead, these courts interpret Supreme Court precedent 
such as Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth to require a student to 
show she has a property interest based on a legitimate entitlement from 
state law.70  For example, students could show that a state statute directly 
provides a property interest in her continued enrollment.71  A student 
could also show that under state law the relationship between a student 
and an educational institution is contractual in nature, and thus a property 
interest can arise from that relationship.72  For example, a student could 
show that the university’s academic rules and regulations guaranteed that 
the university could not remove students without providing process.73  
Therefore, in these circuits, a student bringing a due process claim must 
first allege a property interest that is specific to state law and that 
provides a legitimate claim of entitlement. 
                                                          
 63.   See, e.g., Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 705 (2d Cir. 1991); Ezekwo v. N.Y.C. Health & 
Hosps. Corp., 940 F.2d 775, 782–83 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 64.   See, e.g., Borrell v. Bloomsburg Univ., 955 F. Supp. 2d 390, 402–03 (M.D. Pa. 2013); 
Ross v. Pa. State Univ., 445 F. Supp. 147, 152–53 (M.D. Pa. 1978). 
 65.   See, e.g., Davis v. George Mason Univ., 395 F. Supp. 2d 331, 335–36 (E.D. Va. 2005), 
aff’d, 193 F. App’x 248 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 66.   See, e.g., Charleston v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill. at Chi., 741 F.3d 769, 772–74 (7th 
Cir. 2013). 
 67.   See, e.g., Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1072 (9th Cir. 2013); T.T. v. 
Bellevue Sch. Dist., 376 F. App’x 769, 770–71 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 68.   See, e.g., Barnes v. Zaccari, 669 F.3d 1295, 1303–05 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 69.   See, e.g., Charleston, 741 F.3d at 772 (first citing Bissessur v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581 
F.3d 599, 601 (7th Cir. 2009); and then citing Williams v. Wendler, 530 F.3d 584, 589 (7th Cir. 
2008)) (finding that no “stand-alone property interest” exists for university students in their 
continued enrollment). 
 70.   See, e.g., Barnes, 669 F.3d at 1303–05 (citing Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 
U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). 
 71.   See, e.g., Harris v. Blake, 798 F.2d 419, 422 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding a Colorado statute 
provides a direct entitlement to public education). 
 72.   See, e.g., Charleston, 741 F.3d at 772–74 (citing Bissessur, 581 U.S. at 601) (finding that 
state law could provide that a student-university relationship is contractual in nature). 
 73.   See, e.g., Ikpeazu v. Univ. of Neb., 775 F.2d 250, 253 (8th Cir. 1985). 
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To illustrate how this approach works in practice, Leone v. Whitford, 
from the District of Connecticut, provides a good example.74  Leone 
brought a due process claim alleging that Central Connecticut State 
University did not provide her sufficient process when the University 
decided not to grant her a teaching degree.75  Leone only cited an implied 
contract as the source of her property interest and did not allege any 
other sources.76  The district court first noted that property interests must 
arise from independent sources of law such as state law.77  The district 
court also noted that contracts, expressed or implied, can serve as a basis 
for a property interest.78  The district court then discussed whether Leone 
had an implied contract with the school based upon promises made to her 
by university officials.79  The district court determined there was not an 
implied contract because the University retained the power to modify the 
agreement (i.e., expel her from the University) at any time.80  Therefore, 
the district court concluded that there was not an alleged property interest 
because there was no contract, and thus the court dismissed her claim.81 
2. The Generalized Approach to Education Property Interests 
The second approach to determine whether a property interest exists 
in education is the generalized approach, where courts recognize a 
generalized property interest in education.  Currently, the First,82 Sixth,83 
and Tenth84 Circuits utilize the generalized approach.  These circuits 
have extended property interests in primary education to higher 
education without considering state law.85  Courts using the generalized 
                                                          
 74.   No. 3-05-cv-823 (JCH), 2007 WL 1191347 (D. Conn. Apr. 19, 2007), aff’d, 300 F. App’x 
99 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 75.   Id. at *1. 
 76.   Id. at *6. 
 77.   Id. at *8 (citing Ezekwo v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 940 F.2d 775, 782 (2d Cir. 
1991)). 
 78.   Id. (first citing Ezekwo, 940 F.2d at 782; and then citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 
593, 602 (1972)). 
 79.   Id. at *8–9 (“More importantly, it is also apparent that CCSU and Whitford retained the 
authority to override whatever agreements the School’s subordinate officers were making with 
Leone.”). 
 80.   Id. at *8–9. 
 81.   Id. at *9–10. 
 82.   See, e.g., Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 1988). 
 83.   See, e.g., Martinson v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 562 F. App’x 365, 372 (6th Cir. 
2014); Flaim v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 418 F.3d 629, 633–34 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 84.   See, e.g., Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843, 850 (10th Cir. 1975); Gossett v. Okla. ex rel. 
Bd. of Regents for Langston Univ., 245 F.3d 1172, 1181 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 85.   See infra Section III.B. 
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approach interpret Supreme Court precedent, such as Goss v. Lopez, as 
requiring courts to find that students have a property interest in their 
education.86  For example, in Gorman v. University of Rhode Island, the 
First Circuit held that “[i]t is . . . not questioned that a student’s interest 
in pursuing an education is included within the fourteenth amendment’s 
protection of liberty and property.”87  After determining Goss provided a 
generalized property interest, the Gorman court decided that process was 
sufficient.88  Courts using this approach do not typically analyze state 
law; instead courts rely on precedent within their circuit to find a 
property interest exists.89 
Lee v. Kansas State University, from the District of Kansas, 
exemplifies how this approach works in practice.90  In Lee, the plaintiff 
brought a due process claim alleging that Kansas State University 
violated her procedural due process rights when the University dismissed 
her from a graduate studies program.91  The district court first noted that 
Goss held that “once provided, public education becomes ‘a property 
interest which may be protected by the Due Process Clause.’”92  Relying 
on Tenth Circuit precedent, the district court acknowledged that the 
Tenth Circuit has “extended and expanded this right,” such that there is 
now “a more generalized property interest in continuing graduate 
education.”93  Therefore, the district court concluded, “the Tenth Circuit 
recognizes a constitutional right to due process before a student can be 
deprived of her property interest in her continued enrollment and 
graduate education.”94  Notably, the district court did not reference or 
consider state law in its determinations; instead, the district court made 
clear that Goss and Tenth Circuit precedent provided the plaintiff a 
generalized property interest.95 
                                                          
 86.   See, e.g., Gorman, 837 F.2d at 12 (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574–75 (1975), as 
a basis for a student’s property interest in education). 
 87.   Id. (emphasis added) (citing Goss, 419 U.S. at 574–75). 
 88.   Id. at 12–16. 
 89.   See, e.g., Gossett, 245 F.3d at 1181 (citing Harris v. Blake, 798 F.2d 419, 422 (10th Cir. 
1986)). 
 90.   No. 12-cv-2638-JAR-DJW, 2013 WL 2476702 (D. Kan. June 7, 2013). 
 91.   Id. at *4. 
 92.   Id. at *6 (quoting Goss, 419 U.S. at 574). 
 93.   Id. (quoting Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843, 850 (10th Cir. 1975)). 
 94.   Id. 
 95.   See id. 
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3. Liberty Interests 
In addition to property interests, students may also have a liberty 
interest in their education.  This Comment does not directly address 
whether a liberty interest exists, but such an interest may represent an 
alternative source of protection for students.  “The Supreme Court has 
declined to define liberty with ‘any great precision,’” but the Supreme 
Court has defined the concept broadly.96  For example, a person may 
have a protected liberty interest when the government puts that person’s 
reputation at risk.97  In Goss, the Supreme Court held that academic-
related actions “could seriously damage the students’ standing with their 
fellow pupils and their teachers as well as interfere with later 
opportunities for higher education and employment.”98  Therefore, the 
Supreme Court held that students in primary school have a liberty 
interest in their education.99 
After Goss, a major question was whether liberty interests also 
applied to students in higher education, a question that has not yet been 
settled.100  For example, when the Supreme Court had the opportunity to 
address the issue, it chose to assume a liberty interest existed without 
deciding the issue.101  Lower courts have commonly used this approach 
when addressing liberty interests.102  Courts that have reached the merits 
of the issue have reached different results with some finding that a liberty 
interest exists, while other courts have found that no such interest 
exists.103  While the liberty interest issue is unsettled, it does represent a 
possible way for students to access due process outside of property 
interests. 
                                                          
 96.   WASSERMAN, supra note 33, at 41 (quoting Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)). 
 97.   Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (first quoting Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 
U.S. 433, 437 (1971); and then citing Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 
(1972)). 
 98.   Id. at 575. 
 99.   Id. at 575–76. 
 100.   See Lallo, supra note 55, at 579–81. 
 101.   See Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 84–85 (1978). 
 102.   See, e.g., Smith v. Davis, 507 F. App’x 359, 362–63 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 103.   Compare Jaksa v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 597 F. Supp. 1245, 1247–48 (E.D. Mich. 
1984) (first citing Goss, 419 U.S. at 575; then citing Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 
(1971); and then citing Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)) (finding that a 
liberty interest existed), aff’d, 787 F.2d 590 (6th Cir. 1986), with Shaboon v. Duncan, 252 F.3d 722, 
729–32 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that the plaintiff did not have a liberty interest). 
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C. Horowitz and Ewing 
After Goss, the Supreme Court has twice heard education-based due 
process claims at the university level but in both cases chose to forgo the 
property interest question.104  These cases serve as the basis for a third 
approach for addressing property interests in education.  This approach 
avoids the property interest question altogether by assuming a property 
interest exists.  In both Horowitz and Ewing, the Supreme Court assumed 
that a property interest existed in education without deciding the question 
and then went on to determine that the student received the required 
amount of process under the law.105  Since Horowitz and Ewing, it has 
become common for lower courts to use the assumption approach when 
addressing student due process claims.106 
1. The Supreme Court Revisits the Education Due Process Question 
The assumption approach is the result of two Supreme Court cases, 
Horowitz and Ewing.  In Horowitz, a medical student brought a due 
process claim against the University of Missouri-Kansas City for 
dismissing her for academic reasons.107  The Supreme Court first 
discussed whether Horowitz had a protected interest. 108  The Supreme 
Court noted that the plaintiff never alleged a property interest, but that if 
she were to do so, she would have to rely upon Missouri state law to 
have a valid claim.109  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court assumed the 
plaintiff had a property interest in her case without deciding the 
question.110  Instead of addressing the property interest question, the 
Supreme Court found that the University provided the plaintiff sufficient 
process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore the Supreme 
Court never determined whether the student had a property interest in her 
education.111 
                                                          
 104.   See Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 84–85; Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 
222–23 (1985). 
 105.   Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 84–85; Ewing, 474 U.S. at 222–23. 
 106.   Joseph M. Flanders, Academic Student Dismissals at Public Institutions of Higher 
Education: When Is Academic Deference Not an Issue?, 34 J.C. & U.L. 21, 22 (2007). 
 107.   Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 79–80. 
 108.   Id. at 82. 
 109.   Id. 
 110.   Id. at 84–85. 
 111.   Id. 
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Seven years later, the Supreme Court, in Ewing, revisited the 
question of whether a university student has a property interest in his 
education.112  In Ewing, the University of Michigan dismissed a student 
for failing an examination.113  As a result, the student brought a 
substantive due process challenge against the University for violating his 
due process rights.114  Ewing alleged that he had a property interest in his 
continued enrollment in his academic program.115  The Supreme Court, 
relying on Horowitz, assumed the plaintiff had a property interest 
without deciding the question and instead looked to whether process was 
sufficient.116  The Supreme Court relied upon the principle of 
constitutional avoidance to justify its decision.117  Notably, the 
University of Michigan asked the Supreme Court to assume a property 
interest existed instead of disputing whether such an interest existed.118  
There are two main takeaways from these cases.  First, the Supreme 
Court did not address the merits of whether a student has a property 
interest in her education because the Court only assumed such an interest 
existed without deciding the question.119  Second, these cases have 
served as the basis for the assumption approach to property interests in 
education.120 
2. The Assumption Approach in Action 
While the Supreme Court’s assumption approach did not create 
precedent on the issue of whether a property interest existed, courts 
commonly use this approach when addressing student due process 
claims.121  Currently the Fifth122 and Eighth123 Circuits almost 
exclusively use the assumption approach when addressing property 
interests in student due process cases.  The assumption approach is 
                                                          
 112.   See Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 215, 217 (1985). 
 113.   Id. at 215. 
 114.   Id. at 217. 
 115.   Id. 
 116.   Id. at 222–23. 
 117.   See id. at 222–27. 
 118.   Id. at 223. 
 119.   See id. at 222–23. 
 120.   See infra Section II.C.2. 
 121.   Flanders, supra note 106, at 22–23. 
 122.   See, e.g., Mathai v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ. & Agric. & Mech. Coll., 959 F. 
Supp. 2d 951, 958 (E.D. La. July 17, 2013), aff’d, 551 F. App’x 101 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 123.   See, e.g., Richmond v. Fowlkes, 228 F.3d 854, 857 (8th Cir. 2000); Ikpeazu v. Univ. of 
Neb., 775 F.2d 250, 253–54 (8th Cir. 1985). 
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different from other approaches this Comment has addressed because it 
does not actually decide whether a student has a property interest.124  
Instead, the assumption approach serves as a gap-filler for courts to avoid 
the property interest question, unless the particular facts of a case require 
that it does so.  Instead of deciding whether a property interest exists, 
many courts proceed straight to determining whether a university 
provided a student sufficient process.125 
To illustrate how this approach works in practice, Mathai v. Board of 
Supervisors of Louisiana State University and Agricultural and 
Mechanical College, from the Eastern District of Louisiana, provides a 
helpful example of the assumption approach.126  In Mathai, the plaintiff 
brought a due process claim against the University for her dismissal from 
the University.127  The district court first stated that for a plaintiff to have 
a valid due process claim she must show a deprivation of a property 
interest and that the University deprived her of constitutionally required 
procedure.128  The district court then noted the defendant did not dispute 
that the plaintiff had a property interest in her education.129  
Nevertheless, the district court “assume[d] without deciding that plaintiff 
has a property . . . interest in her continuing education at LSU.”130  The 
district court recognized two reasons for doing so.131  The first was that 
neither the Supreme Court nor the Fifth Circuit has recognized that such 
an interest existed.132  The second was that the district court determined 
that the plaintiff received sufficient process, and therefore her claim 
could not succeed whether she had a property interest or not.133  In 
summation, courts have developed three different approaches to 
determine whether students have property interests in their education, 
and these three approaches represent a circuit split that should be 
resolved. 
                                                          
 124.   See Ewing, 474 U.S. at 222–23. 
 125.   See infra Section III.A.4. 
 126.   Mathai, 959 F. Supp. 2d 951. 
 127.   Id. at 955. 
 128.   Id. at 958 (citing LaCroix v. Marshall County, 409 F. App’x 794, 803 (5th Cir. 2011)). 
 129.   Id. 
 130.   Id. 
 131.   Id. 
 132.   Id. (first citing Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 84–85 
(1978); and then citing Ekmark v. Matthews, 524 F. App’x 62, 62–63 (5th Cir. 2013)). 
 133.   Id. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
When courts address due process claims brought by students, they 
should decide whether a student has a property interest in her education, 
instead of avoiding the question, and courts should use a state-specific 
approach for determining whether such a property interest exists.  
Federal circuits currently use either a state-specific approach, a 
generalized approach, or an assumption approach to address whether a 
student has a property interest in her education.134  These conflicting 
approaches create a circuit split that causes confusion for lower courts, 
students, and higher education institutions.135  Courts should resolve this 
circuit split by adopting a single approach—the state-specific approach—
when dealing with education-based property interests. 
This section proceeds in two parts.  The first part addresses why 
courts should stop avoiding the property interest question.136  Instead, 
courts should decide these questions if given the opportunity.  Courts 
should do so because the property interest question is a preliminary 
question in a due process claim and cannot be avoided under the 
principle of constitutional avoidance.  Additionally, courts should decide 
the property interest question because it will provide needed guidance to 
lower courts and parties. 
The second part addresses why courts should use the state-specific 
approach to property interests, instead of the generalized approach.137  
When courts consider whether a student in higher education has a 
property interest in her education, they should look to state law to 
determine whether such an interest exists.  Courts should do so because 
the state-specific approach most closely follows Supreme Court 
precedent and avoids conflicts between circuits.  Furthermore, the state-
specific approach is practical to use and is unlikely to reduce protections 
for students in higher education. 
                                                          
 134.   See supra Sections II.B–C. 
 135.   See infra Sections III.A, III.B.1.c. 
 136.   See infra Section III.A. 
 137.   See infra Section III.B. 
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A. Courts Should Decide Whether Students Have a Property Interest in 
Their Education, Instead of Assuming Such an Interest Exists 
Thirty years have passed since the Supreme Court decided Horowitz 
and Ewing, but for many students it remains unclear whether they have a 
property interest in their education.  Over the past three decades, federal 
courts have frequently used the assumption approach for property 
interests in education.138  This approach has hurt judicial efficiency and 
parties by creating uncertainty about whether such claims are valid.139  It 
is time for courts to stop avoiding this question and instead decide 
whether higher education students have a property interest in their 
education. 
1. Constitutional Avoidance 
In both Horowitz and Ewing, the Supreme Court relied upon the 
principle of constitutional avoidance as the justification for assuming that 
a property interest existed,140 but this is not an appropriate use of the 
constitutional avoidance principle.  Constitutional avoidance is a 
principle that requires a court to avoid deciding constitutional issues if it 
can decide the case on other grounds, such as an issue of state law.141  
The principle requires courts to consider whether a constitutional issue is 
“absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.”142  The Supreme Court 
normally uses the principle when it can rely on other grounds such as a 
statutory question to decide the outcome of a case.143  The purpose of the 
principle is to ensure that the Supreme Court does not issue advisory 
opinions on questions that state law can adequately address.144  The 
Supreme Court has not consistently applied the principle because of the 
difficultly of determining “which constitutional determinations are 
necessary.”145  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has made it clear that 
                                                          
 138.   See, e.g., Smith v. Davis, 507 F. App’x 359, 362–63 (5th Cir. 2013) (recognizing the large 
amount of use of the assumption approach). 
 139.   See infra Sections III.A.2–4. 
 140.   See Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 84–85 (1978); Regents 
of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 222–23 (1985). 
 141.   Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346–47 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 142.   Id. at 347 (quoting Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 295 (1905)). 
 143.   See Charles Gardner Geyh, The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, 65 FLA. L. REV. 493, 
517 (2013). 
 144.   Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 126 (1945) (“[I]f the same judgment would be rendered by 
the state court after we corrected its views of federal laws, our review could amount to nothing more 
than an advisory opinion.”). 
 145.   See Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003, 1028 
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the application of the rule must largely be done on a case-by-case 
basis.146 
The determination of property interests, though, is not the type of 
issue that constitutional avoidance is meant to avoid, because they are a 
fundamental part of any due process question.147  In a due process 
challenge, a plaintiff must show she faced a deprivation of a property 
interest, and therefore a plaintiff’s claim is only valid if she has such an 
interest.148  Courts have consistently held that the question of whether 
there is a property interest should come first in a due process case.149  
“The Court has rendered numerous decisions in the wake of Roth 
reaffirming the idea that property is a precondition of procedural due 
process protection.”150  This is a logical approach because due process 
requires the courts to consider what level of process is sufficient and that 
level changes depending on the property interest.151  Thus, if the property 
interest is not defined, it is unclear which level of process the 
Constitution would require.152  Furthermore, courts routinely dismiss due 
process cases when the plaintiff does not present a valid property 
interest.153  Courts should not use constitutional avoidance in this context 
because due process claims require that the plaintiff have a protected 
interest, and thus that question is “absolutely necessary to a decision of 
the case.”154 
A second major issue with constitutional avoidance—in this 
context—is that the property interest question is a construction of state 
law, not a constitutional question.155  The Supreme Court has made it 
clear that independent sources of law—not the Constitution—create 
property interests.156  Therefore, when a court decides whether a property 
                                                          
(1994). 
 146.   Id. 
 147.   See Merrill, supra note 28, at 887. 
 148.   See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982). 
 149.   See Brown v. Brienen, 722 F.2d 360, 363 (7th Cir. 1983); Littlefield v. City of Afton, 785 
F.2d 596, 600 (8th Cir. 1986), abrogated by Lemke v. Cass County, 846 F.2d 469 (8th Cir. 1987); 
Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59 (1999); Ezekwo v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. 
Corp., 940 F.2d 775, 787 (2d Cir. 1991) (Timbers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 150.   Merrill, supra note 28, at 887. 
 151.   See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976) (creating a framework for 
determining what level of process is due based upon the strength of the private interest). 
 152.   See id. 
 153.   See Merrill, supra note 28, at 886–87. 
 154.   Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346–47 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) 
(quoting Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 295 (1905)). 
 155.   See Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). 
 156.   See supra Section II.A. 
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interest exists, it looks to construct state law and not to make 
constitutional determinations.157  In contrast, the issue of whether a 
defendant provided a plaintiff sufficient process is a constitutional 
question.158  Courts must consider whether a defendant provided the 
plaintiff “constitutionally adequate procedures” to protect her property 
interest.159  In Horowitz and Ewing, the Supreme Court decided the cases 
on the constitutional question of whether there was adequate process and 
not the state law question of whether the plaintiff had a property 
interest.160  If these applications were correct, it seems logical that all 
property interests should be treated in the same way.  That would suggest 
courts should always determine whether there was enough process before 
determining whether a plaintiff has a property interest, which would be 
an illogical result.  This use of the principle seems counter to the type of 
question the principle was designed to avoid, as the Supreme Court is 
actively trying to determine the constitutional question instead of the 
state law question. 
Courts should not rely on constitutional avoidance as justification for 
not deciding the property interest question in education-based due 
process cases.  The property interest question is both an essential element 
of a due process claim and a question of state law, meaning it is not an 
appropriate candidate for constitutional avoidance.  The issue, though, is 
not the Supreme Court’s use of the principle in the 1970s and 1980s; 
instead, it is the continued use today of the assumption approach by 
lower courts.  It is unclear whether lower courts using the assumption 
approach do so because of constitutional avoidance.  Some courts have 
specifically discussed and cited constitutional avoidance as the reason for 
their decisions to assume a property interest existed,161  while others have 
provided no justification for their decisions to assume that an interest 
existed.162  Either way, constitutional avoidance does not appear to be an 
adequate justification; therefore when courts face the property interest in 
education question, they should not rely on constitutional avoidance. 
                                                          
 157.   See supra Sections II.B–C. 
 158.   Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (holding that the 
Constitution, and not state law, defines the required amount of process due). 
 159.   Id. 
 160.   See Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 84–85 (1978); Regents 
of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 222–23 (1985). 
 161.   See, e.g., McMahon v. Salmond, 573 F. App’x 128, 133 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Ewing, 474 
U.S. at 222–25). 
 162.   See, e.g., Richmond v. Fowlkes, 228 F.3d 854, 857 (8th Cir. 2000). 
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2. Guidance to Lower Courts 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Horowitz and Ewing did not create 
precedent on whether students have a property interest in their education, 
and therefore the Supreme Court failed to provide guidance to lower 
courts.  In Horowitz and Ewing, the Supreme Court assumed that the 
plaintiffs had a property interest in their education instead of actually 
determining that the plaintiffs had such an interest.163  The Supreme 
Court did not actually create precedent on the question because it did not 
address the merits of the question.  This lack of precedent has meant a 
lack of guidance for lower courts, which has caused uncertainty.164  This 
section will examine how this lack of guidance affects both lower federal 
courts and state courts. 
a. The Assumption Approach Creates Uncertainty for Lower Federal 
Courts 
Without guidance, lower courts have developed different approaches 
to handle student education claims.165  For example, some courts have 
moved away from the assumption approach and are now deciding 
whether students have a property interest.166  However, subsequent courts 
in the same circuit do not always follow their example and instead 
continue to assume that a property interest exists based upon Horowitz 
and Ewing.167  Intra-circuit splits create problems because they breed 
uncertainty.168  This uncertainty means that district courts in these 
circuits may be confused about what approach to use for determining 
property interests in education. 
The First Circuit provides a good example of this problem.  First, a 
First Circuit panel in Gorman v. University of Rhode Island held that 
“[i]t is . . . not questioned that a student’s interest in pursuing an 
education is included within the fourteenth amendment’s protection of 
                                                          
 163.   See Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 84–85; Ewing, 474 U.S. at 222–23. 
 164.   See Mary D. Fan, Constitutionalizing Informational Privacy by Assumption, 14 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 953, 972–73 (2012) (examining an assumption approach in the context of a right to 
informational privacy). 
 165.   See supra Section II.B–C. 
 166.   See Vigil v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 980 F. Supp. 2d 790, 803 (E.D. Mich. 2013) 
(recognizing a split on how the Sixth Circuit has dealt with these types of interests), aff’d, 609 F. 
App’x 349 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 167.   See id. 
 168.   Michael Duvall, Resolving Intra-Circuit Splits in the Federal Courts of Appeal, 3 FED. 
CTS. L. REV. 17, 17–19 (2009). 
670 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 65 
liberty and property.  Hence, a student facing expulsion or suspension 
from a public educational institution is entitled to the protections of due 
process.”169  Eleven years later, another First Circuit panel in Hennessy v. 
City of Melrose once again visited the question of a university student’s 
property interest in her education.170  Instead of relying on Gorman and 
determining there was a property interest, the panel assumed such an 
interest existed “[i]n an abundance of caution.”171  Even more 
problematic, the panel in Hennessy was skeptical about whether an 
interest should exist all.172  While many district courts in the First Circuit 
have considered education due process cases since Gorman and 
Hennessy, not a single district court case has cited both Gorman and 
Hennessy even though both cases appear to be on point in the circuit.  
For example, in Gomes v. University of Maine System, a district court 
considered only Gorman and did not acknowledge the more recent 
Hennessy at all in determining whether a student had a property interest 
in her education.173  Thus, district courts must choose which circuit panel 
to follow, and therefore courts never establish precedent because courts 
can switch back and forth between the two approaches. 
Another effect of the uncertainty from the assumption approach is 
that it taxes judicial resources.  It does so in two ways.  First, it creates 
inefficiency by not setting precedent on the property interest question.174  
Precedent creates efficiency by removing the burden on decision makers 
to address each case as if it were a case of first impression.175  As one 
scholar noted about the importance of precedent: 
 When a precedent has no decisional significance as a precedent, the 
conscientious decisionmaker must look at each case in its own fullness.  
But when a rule external to the decisionmaker compels reliance on the 
decisions of others, it frees the decisionmaker from these 
responsibilities . . . .  Thus, a decisionmaker choosing to rely on 
precedent may justifiably ‘relax,’ in the sense of engaging in less 
                                                          
 169.   Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 1988) (citation omitted) (first citing Goss 
v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574–76 (1975); and then citing Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 
150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961)). 
 170.   194 F.3d 237, 249–50 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 171.   Id. at 250. 
 172.   Id. at 249–50 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 229 (Powell, 
J., concurring)). 
 173.   365 F. Supp. 2d 6, 15–17 (D. Me. 2005). 
 174.   In both Horowitz and Ewing, the Supreme Court chose to not create precedent on whether 
students have a property interest in their continued enrollement at a university or other institute of 
higher education.  See Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 84–85 (1978); 
Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 222–23 (1985). 
 175.   See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 599 (1987). 
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scrutiny of the case, where that decisionmaker chooses to rely on a 
precedent.  And where a rule of precedent urges a decisionmaker to 
relax in this sense, the net product will be a substantial reduction in 
decisionmaking effort.176 
The assumption approach undermines this efficiency by requiring 
courts to continually re-evaluate whether a property interest exists.  As 
previously mentioned, the First Circuit cases provide an example of the 
inefficiency of not having precedent on this topic.177  Instead of looking 
to binding precedent, courts have to constantly re-evaluate where a 
student has a property interest in her education.  Second, it taxes judicial 
resources by forcing courts to hear claims that may be meritless.  Courts 
do not want to interpret precedent incorrectly, so they assume property 
interests exist, even if they do not believe the interests exist.178  This 
means courts hear cases that may have no merit in the first place, but, 
because of the assumption approach, the courts must continue to 
entertain them, which is a waste of judicial resources.  Ultimately, the 
assumption approach leaves it to the lower courts to handle the property 
interest question, but that can be taxing on judicial resources, as there is 
no clear path to go forward. 
b. The Assumption Approach Creates Uncertainty for State Courts 
The assumption approach has also affected state courts and altered 
the way they consider education-based due process claims.  State courts 
may suffer from many of the same problems as other lower federal 
courts, but Horowitz and Ewing also affect them differently due to their 
connection with state law.  Since Horowitz and Ewing, state courts have 
frequently assumed that a property interest existed in education-based 
due process claims.179  Courts normally follow the same pattern as 
Horowitz and Ewing.  For example, the Texas Court of Appeals held that 
“[e]ven assuming that appellant had a protectible property right that gave 
rise to procedural rights under the due process clause, the facts in the 
                                                          
 176.   Id. 
 177.   See supra notes 169–73 and accompanying text. 
 178.   See, e.g., Hennessy v. City of Melrose, 194 F.3d 237, 249–50 (1st Cir. 1999) (assuming a 
property interest exists in an “abundance of caution” even though the court found that a property 
interest was “dubious” (citing Ewing, 474 U.S. at 229 (Powell, J., concurring))). 
 179.   See, e.g., Nickerson v. Univ. of Alaska Anchorage, 975 P.2d 46, 52 (Alaska 1999); 
Lachtman v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 147, 156 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007); Lunde v. 
Iowa Bd. of Regents, 487 N.W.2d 357, 361 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992); Doe v. Bd. of Regents of the 
Univ. of Neb., 788 N.W.2d 264, 293 (Neb. 2010); Tobias v. Univ. of Tex. at Arlington, 824 S.W.2d 
201, 209 (Tex. App. 1991). 
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present case show that appellant was afforded adequate procedural due 
process.”180 
State courts’ using the assumption approach is problematic because 
that means state courts are not interpreting their own laws.  The question 
of whether a person has a property interest is largely a question of state 
law.181  Therefore, state courts are actually the entities best fit to 
determine whether a student has a property interest.182  Yet, under the 
current approach, state courts follow the United States Supreme Court in 
assuming a property interest exists based upon their own laws but not 
actually deciding that question.  Some courts, such as the Supreme Court 
of Hawaii, have rejected this approach and instead have examined their 
own laws to determine whether a student has an interest or not.183  
Another issue with state courts’ using the assumption approach is that 
state courts are no longer providing guidance to federal courts on what 
their laws mean.  This is problematic because federal courts using the 
state-specific approach to education-based property interests rely upon 
state courts to determine whether a property interest exists.184  As state 
courts are the ultimate interpreters of their own statutes, it is logical that 
state courts should not rely on the assumption approach when addressing 
property interests in education. 
3. Actively Deciding the Property Interest Question Will Best Protect 
Defendants 
When courts use the assumption approach, they fail to address a 
large portion of a due process claim, and that means defendants may face 
claims that are lacking in merit.  The assumption approach does not meet 
modern pleading standards because it allows plaintiffs to present a claim 
that is missing an essential element.  Pleadings standards in the modern 
era have become stricter and require plaintiffs to show more than they 
might have in the past.185  In two cases, Ashcroft v. Iqbal186 and Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,187 the Supreme Court expanded the scope of 
                                                          
 180.   Tobias, 824 S.W.2d at 209. 
 181.   See Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). 
 182.   See Ikpeazu v. Univ. of Neb., 775 F.2d 250, 253 (8th Cir. 1985) (discussing the role of 
state law in determining whether a property interest in education existed). 
 183.   See, e.g., Soong v. Univ. of Haw. at Hilo, 825 P.2d 1060, 1061–62 (Haw. 1992). 
 184.   See Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 87–88 (1978). 
 185.   A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 431–32 (2008). 
 186.   556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 187.   550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
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pleading requirements.188  The Supreme Court held that “[t]o survive a 
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.’”189  The Supreme Court went on to state: “A claim has facial 
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court 
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 
misconduct alleged.”190  Therefore, in the modern pleading era, courts 
require plaintiffs to show they have a potentially valid claim, before a 
court will allow the claim to continue.191 
Courts often use the assumption approach in a manner that is 
inconsistent with Iqbal/Twombly.  Under the assumption approach, 
courts commonly allow claims to continue even if the plaintiff does not 
allege a property interest.192  As previously discussed, courts generally 
find that a preliminary question in any due process case is whether the 
plaintiff has a property interest (or another type of protected interest).193  
Therefore, when a plaintiff does not allege a property interest, it does not 
appear to meet the plausibility standard as the claim is missing an 
essential element.194  In fact, many courts have found that the proper 
remedy if a plaintiff does not allege a protected interest is to dismiss the 
case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).195  For example, in 
Bissessur v. Indiana University Board of Trustees, the Seventh Circuit 
held that “[the plaintiff’s] complaint falls drastically short of providing 
the necessary factual details to meet the Twombly standard,” because it 
failed to allege a property interest.196  As the assumption approach allows 
plaintiffs to continue their claim without alleging a property interest, it 
does not meet the heightened pleading requirements under 
Iqbal/Twombly.197 
The assumption approach also imposes unnecessary costs upon 
defendants.  The Iqbal/Twombly standards are designed to ensure that 
plaintiffs cannot “unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed 
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 190.   Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 
 191.   Miller, supra note 188, at 19–21. 
 192.   See, e.g., Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 82 (1978); Trotter 
v. Regents of the Univ. of N.M., 219 F.3d 1179, 1184 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 193.   See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
 194.   See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678–79. 
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with nothing more than conclusions.”198  As the Seventh Circuit noted, 
“Twombly ‘teaches that a defendant should not be forced to undergo 
costly discovery unless the complaint contains enough detail, factual or 
argumentative, to indicate that the plaintiff has a substantial case.’”199  In 
Bissessur, the Seventh Circuit noted that allowing a claim to continue 
without a valid property interest “would sanction a fishing expedition 
costing both parties, and the court, valuable time and resources.”200  
Courts should not subject defendants to discovery under the assumption 
approach, as the approach does not meet the Iqbal/Twombly standards. 
A prime example of this problem is Board of Curators of the 
University of Missouri v. Horowitz.201  As previously discussed, the 
plaintiff in Horowitz brought a due process claim against the University 
for her academic dismissal.202  In her complaint, Horowitz did not allege 
that she had a property interest in her education or provide a source of a 
property interest.203  Nevertheless, the district court allowed the claim to 
continue on the question of whether the University had provided 
Horowitz enough process.204  The case lasted over three years and made 
it on appeal all the way to the Supreme Court without ever resolving the 
property interest question.205  In contrast to the property interest question, 
the question the Supreme Court did consider—the adequacy of process—
involves factual considerations and discovery.206  Under Iqbal/Twombly, 
courts should instead dismiss cases that do not show a valid property 
interest to ensure that defendants are protected from discovery that 
should not occur. 
4. Actively Deciding the Property Interest Question Will Best Protect 
Plaintiffs 
The assumption approach is also harmful to plaintiffs, because courts 
allow claims to continue even if the claims are not viable.  One of the 
reasons the assumption approach exists is that courts rarely find that 
                                                          
 198.   Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678–79. 
 199.   Bissessur, 581 F.3d at 603 (quoting Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, 520 F.3d 
797, 802–03 (7th Cir. 2008)). 
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universities did not provide students enough process.207  Courts do not 
have to address the merits of the property interest question if they find 
that process was sufficient.208  This harms plaintiffs because it allows 
claims to continue even if they are not viable—meaning that plaintiffs 
can lose both time and money.  Horowitz provides a good example of 
this, just as it does for defendants.209  The student in Horowitz had to 
spend three years to determine whether the University had provided her 
enough process,210 and if it had turned out she had not been provided 
adequate process, her case would have had to go back to the question of 
whether she had a property interest in the first place.  This is an illogical 
and an unfair result for a plaintiff when the property interest question is a 
preliminary question. 
The assumption approach also may represent a purposeful decision 
by the courts to avoid the property interest question.  The Supreme 
Court, since the due process revolution, has been concerned about there 
being too many property interests protected by the Constitution.211  For 
example, some Supreme Court Justices worried in Goss v. Lopez that 
property interests were going too far.212  The Supreme Court has not 
altered, though, the parameters of property interests.213  Instead, courts 
have used “downstream” methods to “screen out such claims.”214  If the 
courts can find that a deprivation did not violate due process, then it is 
irrelevant whether the plaintiff has a property interest.215  Thus, students 
never know if they have a valid property interest.  This constant cycle of 
indecision is unfair to both plaintiffs and defendants. 
B. Courts Should Use a State-Specific Approach for Determining 
Education Property Interests 
Courts should use state law to determine whether a student has a 
property interest in her education, instead of finding that there is a 
generalized property interest in education, for three main reasons.  The 
                                                          
 207.   Dutile, supra note 8, at 283–84. 
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first is that Supreme Court precedent requires a state-specific approach 
because property interests must arise from independent sources of law.  
Second, courts need to switch to a state-specific approach because not all 
state laws provide students a property interest in their education.  Third, 
the state-specific approach is practical to use and will still provide 
students procedural protections. 
1. Issues with the Generalized Approach 
Courts should choose to use the state-specific approach to property 
interests in education because it most closely follows precedent.  It does 
so for three main reasons.  First, Supreme Court precedent requires 
courts to look to state law and not the Constitution to determine property 
interests in education.216  The Supreme Court’s detailed examination of 
state law in Goss v. Lopez supports this proposition.217  Second, courts 
should not use the generalized approach because it may dramatically 
expand the number of education-based property interests and removes 
the state’s role in determining entitlements.  Third, courts should avoid 
the generalized approach because it creates a constitutional circuit split. 
a. Supreme Court Precedent Requires a State-Specific Approach 
Supreme Court precedent requires that property interests come from 
an independent source of law such as state law.  As previously discussed, 
the Supreme Court made it clear in Board of Regents v. Roth that the 
Constitution does not create property interests; instead, property interests 
derive primarily from state law.218  The Supreme Court has taken a 
hardline position on this and has ensured that state law provides the 
entitlements that property interests require.219  For example, in Leis v. 
Flynt, the Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim because the 
alleged property interest did not specifically arise from a state statute.220  
The Supreme Court has been clear that unless a plaintiff can point to a 
specific state law, then she does not have a property interest. 
The generalized approach conflicts with this precedent by allowing 
plaintiffs to have a property interest without considering state law.  
Circuits using the generalized approach normally rely upon Goss v. 
                                                          
 216.   Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). 
 217.   See Goss, 419 U.S. at 573–74. 
 218.   Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. 
 219.   See Richard B. Stewart, Federalism and Rights, 19 GA. L. REV. 917, 947 (1985). 
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Lopez as the basis for the approach.221  In Goss, the Supreme Court held 
that a group of Ohio high school students had a property interest in their 
continued education.222  The Supreme Court found that Ohio state law 
provided the students a property interest because state law provided a 
free education to all primary students and mandated all students to attend 
primary school.223  At no point did the Supreme Court recognize a 
generalized interest in education, which the Supreme Court’s detailed 
analysis of Ohio state law demonstrates.224  The Supreme Court’s later 
decisions in Horowitz and Ewing support the position that courts must 
look to state laws to find property interests in education.225  In Horowitz 
and Ewing, the Supreme Court assumed a property interest existed in 
education.226  If the Supreme Court believed that Goss stood for the 
proposition that all students have a property interest in education, then 
the Court would have recognized such an interest in Horowitz and 
Ewing, but it did not.  Goss cannot serve as a basis for a generalized 
approach because the Supreme Court’s actions show that courts should 
look to state law to determine if students have a property interest in their 
education. 
b. The Generalized Approach Undermines Supreme Court Precedent 
The generalized approach undermines Supreme Court precedent by 
removing states from the property interest question.  The Supreme Court 
created the independent-source system to ensure that federal courts 
would not have to define property interests.227  The Supreme Court’s 
reasoning was two-fold.  First, the Supreme Court felt that federal judges 
were ill-suited to create a list of property interests, and that property 
interests “would be more objective and constrained” if courts relied upon 
state law.228  Courts have also expressed concern that property interests 
may become outdated if left to the courts to decide.229  The second reason 
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is that the Supreme Court designed Roth and its line of cases to protect 
states and ensure they play a role in defining property interests.230  
Specifically, the Supreme Court wanted to give the states the power to 
decide when they wanted to provide entitlements.231  The generalized 
approach undermines both of these goals by allowing courts, not states, 
to define whether students have a property interest in their education. 
Some scholars have raised criticisms of relying upon state law to 
determine property interests, but these criticisms do not justify the 
generalized approach.  Authors Sidney Shapiro and Richard Levy have 
argued that once a state provides a benefit, they should be required to 
provide enforceable standards for that benefit.232  Other scholars have 
also criticized the entitlement system because it rests the power to 
determine property interests in the hands of state legislative branches.233  
Scholars, though, are not advocating for a change in just education 
property interests; instead they are advocating for changing the entire 
system.234  Therefore, it would not be appropriate to change it in just the 
education context. 
The difficulty with a generalized property interest is defining its 
scope.  For example, does it extend beyond enrollment to areas such as 
grades or scholarship?  Courts have criticized the idea of a generalized 
property interest because such a property interest could be extended to 
many different areas.235  For example, one court feared that a generalized 
property interest would mean due process would entitle students to a 
hearing if the students received a grade they did not like.236  While that 
may seem like an absurd result, an Eighth Circuit panel has suggested 
that a student may have a property interest in grading to the extent a 
professor could not grade her “capriciously.”237  It could be extended 
further.  For example, could a student have a property interest in a 
school-funded scholarship or a property interest in playing on the 
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football team?238  Some students have even alleged that they have a 
property interest in their future professional sports careers.239  Increasing 
property interests also increase costs, as states have to pay to provide 
more procedure for students.240  Courts should not use the generalized 
approach because it undermines Supreme Court precedent that calls for 
states, and not judges, to determine what property interests are. 
c. Constitutional Circuit Splits 
The different approaches to educational property interests create a 
constitutional circuit split that courts should seek to resolve.  
Constitutional circuit splits raise many issues that regular circuit splits 
may not.241  Courts in general try to avoid this type of circuit split 
because of a belief that constitutional law in particular should be uniform 
in the United States to protect the legitimacy of the courts.242  
Constitutional circuit splits also raise practical concerns, such as their 
effect on the doctrine of qualified immunity.243  Qualified immunity 
requires that the law be settled before liability is imposed on state 
officials.244  Therefore, plaintiffs will face difficulty in bringing due 
process claims until the property interest question is settled.245  The 
Supreme Court has also expressed concern with this type of circuit split 
because it means that individuals in some circuits will have rights, which 
individuals in other circuits will not have.246 
2. Differences Between the Two Approaches 
While many students will have similar property interests under both 
the state-specific approach and the generalized approach, there are 
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practical differences between the approaches.  Two key differences are 
clear initially.  First, students will only have a property interest in their 
education if a state law provides them that interest.247  Second, students 
will be required to assert a property interest at the beginning of their 
claim, or their claim will face dismissal.248  Notably, the state-specific 
approach may not provide all higher education students a property 
interest in their education.249  Lower courts using the state-specific 
approach have in the past rejected property interests in education based 
upon state law.250  While this raises legal considerations that have been 
already discussed,251 this section will focus on how the approach will 
function differently in practice.  Thus, in general, there are differences 
between the two approaches.  Two specific areas need to be examined to 
understand the practical differences.  The first is contract law, which 
some have suggested may provide a property interest to all students.252  
The second is primary education, which may affect how courts view 
property interests in higher education. 
a. Contract Law 
Contract law is a major source of property interests for students, but 
like other sources, contracts require courts to analyze state law to 
determine whether there is a property interest.  Courts have been clear 
that not “every state contract gives rise to such a protectible property 
interest.”253  Normally, the question revolves around whether the contract 
“confers a protected status or where the contract provides that the state 
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can terminate the contract only for cause.”254  In the education context, 
lower courts have found that not all student-university relationships 
create contracts that give rise to property interests.255  Specifically, lower 
courts have rejected contracts that are not clear or specific enough to 
provide a property interest.256  While contract law may provide many 
students a property interest in their education, unlike the generalized 
approach, not all students will have a protected property interest. 
b. Primary Education 
While this Comment has focused on university-level education, the 
way in which the Supreme Court has handled primary education may 
help explain the generalized approach.  As previously mentioned, in 
Goss, the Supreme Court held that the Ohio high school students had a 
property interest in their education based upon state laws that provided 
free education to all primary students and made it compulsory to 
attend.257  Based upon that holding, lower courts have generally held that 
primary students have a property interest in their continued enrollment in 
school.258  The reason for this is that since all states provide free primary 
education and compulsory education,259 then all primary students also 
have this property interest in their education.  First, it should be noted 
that while primary students may have a property interest based upon 
Goss, that does not appear to be the case for university students because 
university-level education is not free or compulsory.  Second, the 
relationship between a university student and a university is significantly 
different from the relationship between a primary student and a school.260  
Third, the language of Goss and how courts have applied it to primary 
education may have influenced lower courts to believe it created a 
generalized property interest.261  While primary students may have a 
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property interest that is close to universal, this line of reasoning does not 
apply to higher education, and therefore a state-specific approach will 
not provide the same interests as a generalized approach. 
3. Advantages of the State-Specific Approach 
A state-specific approach has both practical and legal advantages.  
Many of the legal benefits have already been mentioned such as closely 
following Supreme Court precedent, ensuring courts do not have to 
determine what is a property interest, and preventing a constitutional 
circuit split.262  In addition to these legal advantages, a state-specific 
approach also provides other advantages, including that it is practical to 
use and that it will not reduce protections for students.  The next two 
sections will consider each of these advantages separately. 
a. The State-Specific Approach is Practical to Use 
The state-specific approach is efficient and easy for courts to 
manage.  It should be noted that the generalized approach has inherent 
benefits as courts do not have to decide if a student has a property 
interest.  However, the state-specific approach is also practical.  There 
are many different methods that courts can rely on to determine whether 
a student has a property interest in her education.  First, under the state-
specific approach, it is the plaintiff’s burden to prove she has a property 
interest in education.263  This means that courts will not have to struggle 
with finding property interests for plaintiffs as they will have to do so 
themselves.  Notably, that also provides the benefit of ensuring that 
defendants are placed on notice of what interest the plaintiff is 
claiming.264  Federal courts also can rely on state courts to provide 
guidance on what state laws provide property interests.265  Finally, once a 
court determines that state law provides a property interest for a student, 
then another student in that state can use that decision as precedent, and 
so this area of law will be relatively stable, and courts can settle the law 
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state-by-state over time.266  While a state-specific approach does require 
courts to evaluate state law to find a property interest, the approach is 
still efficient as courts have many tools available to them to determine if 
a student has a property interest in her education. 
b. The State-Specific Approach Will Not Reduce Protections for 
Students 
A state-specific approach will not guarantee every student a property 
interest in education, but it will still provide significant due process 
protections for students.  If courts stop using the generalized approach, 
property interests will still exist under state law.267  In fact, many courts 
have found that state law provides students’ property interests.268  While 
protections may not extend to more obscure interests, such as interests in 
grades, it will likely extend to core property interests such as continued 
enrollment in school.269  Therefore, many students will likely still have a 
property interest in their education under a state-specific approach. 
Even if a student does not have a property interest, she is likely not 
lacking in process, because courts almost never find that a university did 
not provide a student enough process in “academic” (as opposed to 
“disciplinary”) situations.270  Courts have held educational institutions to 
a very low bar on how much process they have to provide to students in 
these cases.271  Following the Supreme Court’s lead in cases like 
Horowitz, courts largely defer to educational institutions and have 
avoided “second-guessing” their decisions in “academic” contexts.272  
For example, one review of education-based due process claims found 
that of fifty-nine cases studied, in only five did the court find that process 
was not sufficient.273  While some students will not have a property 
interest in their education, that does not mean they will be losing process 
that they would otherwise get. 
Finally, protections provided by universities are not necessarily tied 
to due process, and therefore many universities will continue to provide 
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protections for students whether a student has a property interest or not.  
The Due Process Clause only sets a threshold for what process is 
required, and universities can provide more protection than is required.274  
And they do.  A study of university protections showed that “most 
institutions afford their students procedural safeguards that current law 
does not require.”275  Students can also look to other methods to protect 
their rights such as contract law, which can provide many similar 
protections to due process law.276  Under the state-specific approach, 
many universities will likely still provide protections for students 
regardless of whether the student has a property interest in her education. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
When deciding due process claims brought by students, courts 
should no longer assume a property interest in education exists and 
instead should look to state law to determine whether a student has such 
an interest.  Courts should actively decide the property interest question 
because it will provide guidance to lower courts and ensure judicial 
efficiency by creating precedent on the property interest question.  This 
guidance will also help protect plaintiffs and defendants by ensuring that 
courts dismiss meritless claims and that resources and time are not 
wasted. 
Courts should use the state-specific approach, instead of the 
generalized approach when determining whether a student has a property 
interest in her education.  Supreme Court precedent has always required 
that property interests arise from state law, and therefore education 
property interests should follow this precedent.  Furthermore, the two 
approaches have created a constitutional circuit split on the property 
interest question.  Consequently, students in some circuits have a 
generalized property interest in education, while students in other circuits 
have to prove that state law provides them with such an interest.  The 
state-specific approach will resolve these concerns while still being 
practical for the courts to use and not reducing protections for students. 
Courts can and should change to a single-approach to property 
interests.  Courts should no longer avoid the property interest question 
                                                          
 274.   See Dutile, supra note 8, at 280–82. 
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University Student, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 289, 297 (1999). 
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Academic, and Consumer Contexts, 30 J.C. & U.L. 175, 175–76 (2003) (discussing the role of 
contract law in the protections of both private and public students). 
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but instead attempt to settle the question for students and educational 
institutions.  Forty years after Goss, it is time for a single approach to 
education-based property interests to arrive. 
 
